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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All of the parties to the appeal are listed in the caption (Garth Gines, 
plaintiff-appellant, and Sean Edwards, defendant-appellee ). Mr. Gines' s sister, 
Christine Fountaine, was a plaintiff in the court below but is not involved in this 
appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103O). Prior to 
transfer, the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-
102O). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Appellant Gines contends that Defendant was late in producing 
the expert report of his expert, Dr. Alan Goldman, and therefore Dr. Goldman's 
testimony should have been excluded at trial. The issue for the court is whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in finding the allegedly tardy production 
harmless and allowing Dr. Goldman to testify. 
Standard of review. The trial court's assessment of harmlessness is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Coro/es v. State of Utah, 2015 UT 48, ,r 12. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below, R. 632. However, the 
record on appeal does not include a transcript of the hearing in which the trial court 
stated its findings, which the court expressly incorporated in its order. 
Accordingly, the court's ruling must be presumed correct. See pp. 23-24, n. 7, 
infra. 
ISSUE 2: The trial court permitted defendant's expert Dr. Goldman to 
testify at trial that Mr. Gines suffered only temporary injuries in the accident, and 
regarding the typical expenses associated with such injuries. Mr. Gines contends 
1 
that such testimony was not contained within Dr. Goldman's expert report and the 
trial court should not have allowed it. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. R. 1483, R. 1693 at 
390:17-391:23, 414:1-416:13, 507:1-20. 
Standard of review: A trial court's admission of expert testimony is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, ,r 10, 285 P. 3d 
1168. 
ISSUE 3: As noted, Dr. Goldman opined that Mr. Gines's injuries were 
temporary and estimated the expenses typically associated therewith. Mr. Gines 
contends that Dr. Goldman did not have a non-arbitrary basis for this testimony 
( which Mr. Gines refers to as "apportionment"). The issue for the Court is whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Dr. Goldman laid sufficient 
foundation for the testimony. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. R. 414:1-416:13; R. 
507:1-20. 
Standard of review: The trial court's admission of testimony is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, ,r 10, 285 P. 3d 
1168. 
2 
ISSUE 4: The trial court denied Mr. Gines's motion for a directed verdict 
on the amount of medical economic damages. The issue for the court is whether 
the court's ruling was an abuse of discretion. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved. R. 1693, p. 507:1-20; R. 
1580-1578. 
Standard of review: The trial court's denial of a motion for directed 
verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or new trial is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Johnson v. Montoya, 2012 UT App 199, if 7,308 P. 3d 566. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
There are no such provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below 
This is a Tier 2 personal injury action that arose when a vehicle driven by 
Defendant, Sean Edwards, struck the rear of a vehicle in which plaintiff Garth 
Gines was riding. Prior to trial, the court found as a matter of law that the 
accident was caused by defendant Edwards' negligence, and that Mr. Gines had 
sustained some injury in the accident. The case was tried to a jury to determine the 
amount of Mr. Gines's economic and non-economic damages caused by the 
.JJ) accident. The jury found that Mr. Gines had incurred Past Medical Expenses of 
~ 3 
$10,000, would incur $0 in future medical expenses due to the accident, and had 
incurred $7,500 in non-economic damages. 
Statement of Facts Pertinent to the Appeal 
On December 2, 2009, a car in which Mr. Gines was riding was rear-ended 
by defendant Sean Edwards. Mr. Gines filed a Tier 2 negligence suit on April 24, 
2012. (R. 1-5.) 
Mr. Gines alleged that he "sustained serious injuries including, but not 
limited to injury to his head, neck, back, arms and legs as well as other injuries 
which are more fully documented in the medical records." (R. 38.) As Mr. Gines 
notes, he experienced other injuries to his neck both before and after the accident. 
(Gines Br., p. 5.) 
During the course of litigation, the parties filed a series of motions in limine 
relating to each other's expert witnesses. On February 25, 2014, Mr. Gines filed a 
motion in limine seeking to exclude the testimony of Dr. Alan Goldman, who had 
performed a medical examination of Mr. Gines pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 35 and had 
been designated by Defendant as a retained expert. 
Mr. Gines contended that Defendant had not provided a copy of Dr. 
Goldman's Rule 35 examination report or a Rule 26 summary of Dr. Goldman's 
opinions along with the data and other information upon which the retained expert 
would rely. (R. 63-78.) Mr. Gines stated that he had opted to receive a report from 
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Dr. Goldman rather than take a deposition, and that the timing of the disclosure 
was "far from harmless," arguing principally that "Defendant has had access to Dr. 
Goldman's report since the end of 2012. This wrongful withholding of Dr. 
l;i$l Goldman's report denied Plaintiffs and their experts to evaluate and meet the 
issues raised by Dr. Goldman. The Plaintiffs are also further harmed by this 
systematic non-disclosure because, at best, it delays the ultimate resolution of their 
claims. The Plaintiffs in this case have already waited in excess of four years .... 
Worst case scenario, the Plaintiffs are further harmed by having to pay their own 
experts more to review the new information, revise reports and perhaps hire 
rebuttal experts late in the game, with shorter time frames for response." (R. 63-
62.) 
In a response filed March 18, 2014, defendant stated that his counsel had 
received an electronic Certificate of Service of a document titled "Plaintiffs 
Elections Regarding Defendant's Experts," but had not received the actual election 
itself and thus did not know whether Mr. Gines was electing a deposition or a 
report. (R. 188 ,r 19, and R. 261; R. 178 ("Defendant did not produce Dr. 
Goldman's expert report because his counsel did not receive the elections 
regarding experts and still does not have this document.").) 
Defendant attached a copy of Dr. Goldman's report to his response, stating, 
J 
"Plaintiff is entitled to an expert report or a deposition, but not both. Now that 
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Defendant knows that Plaintiffs requested the reports they are being produced with 
this memorandum." (R. 179, and R. 260-224 (initial and supplemental reports).) 
Defendant argued that Mr. Gines had not shown prejudice from the timing 
and that much of the four-year delay complained of by Mr. Gines was attributable 
to Mr. Gines's own 2 ½-year delay in filing suit to begin with. (R. 179.) 
Defendant also noted that other harm claimed by Mr. Gines was no more harm 
than Defendant had himself incurred earlier in allowing Mr. Gines to add his sister 
as an additional plaintiff, which had resulted in delay and additional effort and 
expense by Defendant's own expert. (R. 1 79.) Defendant noted that no trial date 
had been set, and that he had agreed to any requested extension of discovery 
deadlines. (R. 178.) 
In response, Mr. Gines questioned the averment that Defendant's counsel 
had not received the election document. Mr. Gines further argued that "Defendant 
had an independent duty to affirmatively disclose Dr. Goldman's report under both 
Rule 26 [expert disclosures] and Rule 35 [medical examination], absent of any 
election of Plaintiffs." (R. 295-296.) Mr. Gines argued that, under Rule 35, 
Defendant was required to provide a copy of the Rule 3 5 examination report even 
if Mr. Gines did not elect a report under Rule 26. (R. 296-295.) Mr. Gines argued 
that this alleged failure "was not cured in expert discovery. Only after the 
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plaintiffs filed a motion seeking the exclusion of the evidence, did the Defendant 
comply and disclose the reports." (R. 295.) 
Mr. Gines's motion in limine regarding Dr. Goldman was argued to the trial 
lab court on April 28, 2014. (R. 304.) With respect to Dr. Goldman, the court stated 
that "[t]he basis for the Court's ruling is set out in greater detail in the record of the 
\Ji hearing of April 28, 2014 .... For the reasons set forth in the record of the April 28 
2014 hearing, it is hereby ordered adjudged and decreed as follows: . . . 2. 
Defendant's failure to timely provide Dr. Alan Goldman's reports was harmless 
and as such will not be excluded from providing testimony at trial in the above 
matter." (R. 631, ,r,r 1-2.)1 
At a pretrial conference on May 19, 2014, the court scheduled trial to begin 
October 8, 2014. (R. 306-309.)2 
On June 9, 2014, Mr. Gines served a document titled "Plaintiffs Rule 26 
Expert Disclosures - Rebuttal". (R. 311.) In this document, Mr. Gines named a 
newly disclosed expert, Dr. Joel Dall, who was identified as testifying regarding 
1 By contrast, the court granted Mr. Gines's simultaneous motion to exclude 
Defendant's expert Dr. John Droge in his entirety, finding, "The Defendant failed 
to provide Dr. John Droge's case and all of the data upon which his opinion was 
based. The failure to provide the foundational data for Dr. Droge's opinions was 
not harmless." (R. 631, ,r,r 2-3.) 
2 The trial date was later moved back to October 27, 2014, to accommodate a 
principal witness. (R. 312.) 
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Mr. Gines's injuries, treatment, and prognosis. Mr. Gines later stipulated that he 
would call Dr. Dall to testify solely with respect to the other plaintiff (Ms. 
Fountaine), and would not ·seek to have Dr. Dall testify regarding Mr. Gines. (R. 
384.) The trial court ultimately permitted Dr. Dall to testify as to the other 
plaintiffs injuries, finding the alleged late disclosure of Dr. Dall harmless. (R. 
1514.) 
Facts relating to "apportionment" 
Defendant's expert Dr. Goldman concluded that Mr. Gines had incurred 
some injuries in the car accident. Dr. Goldman opined, however, that those 
injuries had been temporary in nature, a short-term muscular "sprain" or "strain". 
In his Rule 3 5 examination report ( consisting of responses to a list of questions), 
Dr. Goldman suggested that he did not believe there were any lasting effects from 
the accident. Dr. Goldman opined that Mr. Gines had suffered injuries in the 
motor vehicle accident, but that it would require a more in-depth review of 
imagery to determine. 
whether this was, as are most musculoskeletal dysfunctions, only a 
temporary aggravation to [Mr. Gines's] previous progressive underlying and 
altered anatomy/cervical spine disease which has continued to progress, and 
probably would have even absent the 12-12-09 event. 
(R. 231 ,I 6 (emphasis in original).) 
The following question read, "If the accident in question is only partially 
contributing to the current condition, please indicate and apportion the current 
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condition between this accident and other condition or events." Attempting to 
answer this question although it was based upon a premise he had already rejected, 
Dr. Goldman wrote: 
Overall, if I was to assume that the 12-02-09 MV A may have caused a 
permanent aggravation to Mr. Gines's pre-existent head and neck problems, 
in light of his prior documented abnormalities with progression, I would 
apportion 80% of his current symptomology to his pre-existing cervical 
spine and headaches status and 20% to the MV A of 12-02-09. A final 
answer to this question may have to wait for a closer review of Mr. Gines's 
images. 
(R. 231 ,I 6a ( emphasis in original).) 
Following a more-in depth review of the images, Dr. Goldman issued a 
supplemental report reaffirming his opinion that none of the injuries sustained by 
Mr. Gines in the accident were permanent, stating: 
After carefully reviewing all of the answers in my 12-21-12 report, I do not 
have a need to change any of those responses as a result of this image 
review. As noted in my answer to question #6 (page 30), I did not note any 
acute changes or significant progressions on the images following the 12-02-
09 MV A and, therefore, continue to feel that that event was a temporary 
aggravation to his previous underlying progressive degenerative cervical 
spine disease and altered cervical anatomy from his prior surgical 
procedures. 
(R. 224 (January 25, 2013 report (emphasis in original).) 
Mr. Gines 's motion for partial summary judgment 
On August 19, 2014, Mr. Gines moved for partial summary judgment 
regarding causation. Mr. Gines' s motion was based upon the anticipated trial 
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testimony of defendant's expert, Dr. Goldman, who had been permitted to testify 
under the trial court's ruling at the April 28, 2014, hearing. Seep. 7, supra. 
Mr. Gines argued that Dr. Goldman's expert report should be treated like a 
deposition, and that "[t]he Defense's only expert Dr. Alan Goldman is limited to 
his opinions raised in his expert report. His opinions in that report states that Mr. 
Gines and Ms. Fountaine suffered injuries in this accident. Dr. Goldman is the 
only witness the defendant has to rebut Plaintiff's claims of causation. Dr. 
Goldman ratifies both Plaintiffs' claims of injury. As such, the issue of causation 
is not materially in dispute and should be decided as a matter oflaw." (R. 393.)3 
In response, Defendant did not dispute Dr. Goldman's opinion that Mr. 
Gines had incurred $61,296.60 in reasonable and necessary medical expenses 
related to his condition. However, Defendant did dispute that Mr. Gines's medical 
condition ( and the resulting expenses) were all caused by the accident. Defendant 
pointed to Dr. Goldman's opinion that Mr. Gines's injuries from the accident were 
only temporary. (R. 595-600.) "The jury should be permitted to decide what 
injuries were caused by the accident and what treatment has been or will be 
necessary in the future as a result of the accident," Defendant argued. (R. 595.) 
3 See also R. 396 ("Areas where Dr. Goldman's opinions are favorable to the 
Plaintiffs, no material dispute of fact exists and therefore should also be decided as 
a matter of law instead of being submitted to the jury.") 
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The trial court found it undisputed that Defendant's negligence caused the 
accident and fixed the amount of Mr. Gines's claimed past medical bills at 
$61,296.60. (See Gines Br., p. 7.) The court further found it undisputed that "Mr. 
Gines suffered at least a musculoskeletal injury to the cervical spine, of the 
sprain/strain variety with a temporary aggravation and superimposition upon a 
previously injured and altered symptomatic cervical spine anatomy." (R. 1481, ,r,r 
1-2.) 
The court found that "[ w ]hether Mr. Gines suffered more serious injury as a 
result of this accident, is factually disputed." (R. 1481 ,r,r 1-2, 6.) The court also 
found a factual dispute as to whether Mr. Gines needed future medical care as a 
result of the accident. (R. 1480 ,r,r 7-8.)4 
At trial, both Mr. Gines's and Defendant's counsel told the jury it was 
undisputed that Mr. Gines needed the medical care he had received, including his 
surgery. The issue for the jury was whether, and how much, of that care was 
needed because of the accident. (R. 1690, pp. 115:4-11, R. 121: 14-24.) 
During the trial, two issues arose about the scope of Dr. Goldman's 
anticipated testimony. Before allowing Dr. Goldman to testify, the trial court 
4 As Mr. Gines summarizes it, "The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion for 
partial summary judgment as it found disputed issues of material fact regarding the 
amount of medical bills related to the accident and the need for future medical 
care. (R.632)." (Gines Br., p. 7.) 
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heard argument from the parties. The court also ordered Defendant to put Dr. 
Goldman on the stand outside the presence of the jury in a "Rule 104" proceeding 
to hear the anticipated testimony and cross-examination. (R. 1693, p. 391, pp. 399-
416.) 
Mr. Gines's first objection was to Dr. Goldman estimating the cost of 
reasonable treatment for the temporary injuries he believed Mr. Gines had 
sustained in the accident. (R. 1693 pp. 390-391, 395-396.) Although Dr. 
Goldman had described such treatment itself in his expert report, he had not 
included specific dollar figures. (Id., pp. 396-397.) 
Defendant argued that there was no surprise as to the numbers associated 
with the described treatment of Mr. Gines's temporary injuries, and that Mr. 
Gines' s counsel was experienced and knowledgeable about the customary charges 
for that type of treatment. (R. 1693, p. 398: 10-399: 17. )5 
5 "[T]hey deal with this every day in every case that they have. They know, they 
know what physical therapy costs. They know what chiropractic costs." (R. 1693, 
p. 398:10-13.) "I would submit to the court that this is harmless because we are 
dealing with very, very experienced personal injury attorneys. And they routinely 
present damages for all of their various clients who have been treated by all 
different kinds of doctors. Physical therapists, chiropractors·, orthopedic surgeons, 
neurologists. I mean, whole gamut. They know what these things cost. It really -
it's harmless omission not to have that information there. They are not going to be 
shocked. When they look at the information that is in his report about what 
treatment he did think was necessary, they know from their prior experience from 
having done this for years and years, they can figure out, ballpark it pretty easily 
what that costs." (R. 1693, p. 399: 4-17.) 
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The trial court asked Gines' s counsel if it was claiming surprise with respect 
to the cost of the common procedures: 
[THE COURT]: Let me just ask you. You have done this work for a 
long time. Are you really surprised about what a physical therapist charges? 
This goes to the harmlessness issue .... [A]re you really surprised what a 
physical therapist charges? 
[COUNSEL]: Am I surprised? 
THE COURT: Yes. And it goes to the harmlessness. You guys do 
this work a lot. And so, it seems to me that it wouldn't be much of a 
surprise for you to know that a physical therapist charges between 100 and 
$150 an hour, or per visit. Is that true? I mean, I just need a candid response 
to that. 
[COUNSEL]: The candid response to that, Your Honor, is, no, I'm 
not surprised. Now, as far as the numbers he picked -
THE COURT: Yeah. And I get that. Yeah, that you may be 
surprised in terms of what-
[COUNSEL]: I'm surprised as to what his testimony actually is. 
Because before today I didn't know what he was going to answer to that 
question. So, in that aspect I am surprised. 
(R. 1693, pp. 412:13 -413:22.) 
Mr. Gines's next objection was to what he characterized as testimony 
regarding "apportionment," arguing that it was not mentioned in Dr. Goldman's 
report and that Dr. Goldman did not have a non-arbitrary basis for "apportioning" 
Mr. Gines's damages. 
Defendant pointed out that what Dr. Goldman was doing was not 
"apportionment" as Mr. Gines seemed to be using the term. Dr. Goldman was not 
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apportioning between contributing causes of a permanent (current) condition. 
Rather, he would simply be reaffirming the opinion in his report that the accident 
caused only temporary injuries, which had no lasting effects: 
[B]ecause the apportionment opinion is, he says, if I were to assume that he 
has a permanent disability then I would apportion 80/20. But he says, but 
that's not his opinion. His opinion is that it was a temporary aggravation of 
his already preexisting and degenerating worsening condition, therefore, 
apportionment doesn't even apply. He says it's just a temporary aggravation 
of a sprain/strain injury superimposed upon this already degenerating spine. 
So, there is no apportionment. 
(R. 1693, pp. 388-389.) See also id., p. 389 ("after a certain amount of time [Mr. 
Gines] would have gone back to baseline back to where he was right before the 
accident"), pp. 396-397 ("100 percent of what he is experiencing now is simply 
due to his preexisting condition. Because Dr. Goldman has committed to the 
position that this is temporary. 
Gines].") 
This injury had a temporary effect on [Mr. 
In the alternative (if the accident-related injuries were not temporary), 
Defendant stated that Dr. Goldman would estimate that 20 percent of Mr. Gines's 
condition was attributable to the accident. During his Rule 104 testimony, Dr. 
Goldman testified that, when a doctor does an apportionment, "it's a common 
sense thing. I mean, if you've got someone that's had a preexisting condition, you 
have to figure in how could that affect his current status. And sometimes it's just 
kind of picking numbers out of the air. So, there's no specific, you know, recipe, if 
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you will." (R. 1693, p. 408:2-14.) Shortly afterward, Dr. Goldman clarified, "I 
didn't say I picked numbers out. I say sometimes one does pick numbers out of the 
a1r. There is no recipe." (R. 1693, p. 409:8-13.) 
Dr. Goldman explained that apportionments are guided by the American 
Medical Association Guides for permanent impairment, which provide ranges for 
vj subjective and objective findings; the "arbitrary" numbers are still within the 
prescribed ranges - "you pick a number out of that range." (R. 1693, pp. 410:15 -
412:3.) 
After taking a recess to consider the issue, the court returned with a ruling 
partially sustaining and partially overruling Mr. Gines' s objection to Dr. 
Goldman's anticipated testimony. The court ruled that "I agree with defense 
counsel that apportionment is not an issue. It is defendant's position that no part of 
Mr. Gines's condition today is attributable to the accident. That, at best, Mr. Gines 
suffered a temporary or, at worse, he suffered a temporary aggravation of a 
'J preexisting condition." (R. 1693, p. 414:13-18.) 
The court further stated that, with respect to his apportionment estimate if 
Mr. Gines' s accident-related injuries were permanent, Dr. Goldman had a 
reasonable basis because 
that apportionment is based on the American Medical Association 
Guidelines which provide a range of percentages from which practitioners 
must choose. That discretionary decision is informed by the practitioner's 
examination, training and experience. And while I agree that that's not a 
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precise science, this is the system relied upon in tort litigation, and by 
government to do this work. It's the best system that we have to assess these 
determinations. And for that reason, I conclude that adequate foundation has 
been laid for Dr. Goldman to testify about apportionment. Zero percent if 
we are talking about a temporary aggravation and 20 percent if we are, if 
permanent is where we are. 
(R. 1693, pp. 414:21-415:8.) 
The court barred Dr. Goldman from testifying as to what treatment would 
have been reasonable and necessary for a person with Mr. Gines's altered anatomy 
because that opinion was not fairly encompassed within his report. (R. 1693, p. 
415 :9-23.) The court ruled that Dr. Goldman could testify as to the diagnostic 
costs and treatment that a healthy person who suffered a temporary sprain/strain of 
the cervical spine would normally receive, and the estimated costs thereof. (Id., p. 
415 :9-14.) The court found that "the failure to disclose the progression rate 
generally charged by physical therapists ... is harmless. Counsel are experienced 
attorneys who litigate tort cases, and this is generally known to them." (Id., pp. 
415:24 -416:2.) 
When the trial resumed, Dr. Goldman took the stand. Neither party elicited 
from Dr. Goldman his alternative apportionment opinion (that if the accident were 
assumed to have caused permanent injury, Dr. Goldman would attribute about 20 
percent of Mr. Gines' s present condition to the accident and the rest to preexisting 
conditions). (R. 1693, pp. 417-465, passim.) 
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Instead, Dr. Goldman's testimony focused on his opinion that Mr. Gines's 
injuries from the accident were temporary, meaning they would have lasted less 
than six months. Dr. Goldman testified that "Acute" (as he had characterized Mr. 
Gines's injuries in his report) meant that for "several weeks or a month or two" it 
would bother the patient, after which it would start to diminish and be largely back 
vJ to normal within a six-month window of time. (R. 1693, pp. 429:9 - 430:15, pp. 
433:5 - 434:3; see also p. 462:2-12 ("I can't tell you when it ended. I can just tell 
you that most musculoligamentous injuries within a three to six month maximum 
time do resolve and come back to their baseline. That would be the guideline I 
would use.").6 
On cross-examination, Dr. Goldman was asked, "[A]s a doctor, how do you 
normally define temporary as opposed to permanent?" Dr. Goldman replied, 
"Usually, when you go out six months, you talk about chronic or permanent. So, 
anything within a six month window of time. And this is a little bit arbitrary. But 
l,(ji) that's, most of the definitions is usually past six months. Some people say past 
three months." (R. 433:13-19.) 
6 On cross-examination, Mr. Gines asked Dr. Goldman how long temporary or 
acute injuries took to recover with other patients who had preexisting conditions 
similar to (and "even worse things" than) Mr. Gines. Dr. Goldman stated that, 
with those patients, it had resolved "usually within a three of four, maximum six 
month window of time they had gone back to baseline." (See R. 1693, pp. 464:25-
465:23.) 
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Dr. Goldman testified as to the general treatment that would be expected for 
the type of temporary sprain/strain experienced by Mr. Gines. Dr. Goldman 
opined that the total costs would be about "7, 8,000, $10,000, something like that." 
(R. 1693, pp. 430: 16-431 :7.) On cross-examination, Dr. Goldman agreed that Mr. 
Gines had altered anatomy, and that he was not opining as to what treatment would 
have been required for someone with such altered anatomy. (Id., pp. 445:9-446:8.) 
Consistent with his report, Dr. Goldman opined that it was difficult to define what 
actual treatments would have been of assistance in light of Mr. Gines' s preexisting 
"markedly anatomically altered" cervical spine. (Id., p. 605 :2-11.) 
On redirect, Dr. Goldman testified without objection that treatment would 
not differ materially between someone with Mr. Gines's type of preexisting 
conditions and someone without such conditions. (R. 1693, pp. 457:8-458:5.) The 
principal difference, Dr. Goldman explained, might be that (for example) if the 
patient said he could not bend to the left, then a different method would be used to 
stretch those muscles. "You are doing the same thing, but you may have a 
limitation to what you are able to do because of the patient's condition. But the 
approach to it is exactly the same." (Id., p. 457:8-23.) If anything, Dr. Goldman 
said, the cost of treatment might be less for someone with Mr. Gines's anatomy, 
because the treatment might not be as extensive or use the same modalities. (Id., 
pp. 458:21-459:5.) 
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Dr. Goldman testified that Mr. Gines needed the surgery that he underwent, 
but not because of the car accident. (R. 1693, pp. 459:13--460:15.) Consistent 
with his opinion that Mr. Gines had suffered only temporary injuries in the 
accident, Dr. Goldman also opined that no future medical treatment was needed 
due to the accident. (Id., pp. 434:4--435:12.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Gines questioned Dr. Goldman about his 
testimony that, in defining an injury as "temporary" versus "permanent," "this is a 
little bit arbitrary." (Seep. 17, supra.) Dr. Goldman explained that, when he uses 
the word "arbitrary," he means that a physician is choosing between alternatives 
depending upon the circumstances: 
What I said was, that when you see a patient and you know that they have 
pneumonia, and you know that penicillin will treat pneumonia, but they are 
allergic to penicillin, so, arbitrarily, you decide, well, I better pick another 
antibiotic, maybe Keflex, maybe vancomycin. That's what this is all about. 
If a gentleman comes in and we are going to do physical therapy or whatever 
we are going to do, and he can't do it because of his altered anatomy, his 
pain, his this, his that, then you decide to do something else. That's an 
arbitrary decision. There's no message on the wall that says if you can't do 
A you have to do B. You are a doctor. You have had experience. You do 
what's best for the patient. If you want to call that arbitrary, if I use the 
word arbitrary, what it means is you think about what's going on. And you 
pick the right thing for that patient. 
(R. 1693, pp. 448:7--449:5; see also pp. 447:24--448:6 (explaining that he was not 
"pick[ing] something out of the air," that his testimony was to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty, and suggesting that Mr. Gines's counsel was playing "a word 
game" with the word "arbitrary").) 
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At the conclusion of the evidence, the court instructed the jury that "Garth 
Gines has incurred medical expenses in the amount of $61,296.60. The Defendant 
does not stipulate that all of those expenses were caused by Sean Edward's 
negligence." (R. 1493 (Instr. 15).) The court also instructed the jury, "It has been 
conclusively determined that the medical expenses claimed by ... Garth Gines was 
reasonable and necessary." (R. 1534 (Instr. 31).) 
The court gave the jury a Special Verdict Form with "Yes" filled in for 
whether defendant Sean Edwards was at fault and "Was Sean Edward's fault a 
cause of Garth Gine's [sic] harm?" (R. 1560.) With respect to Gines, the jury 
filled in the verdict form: Past Medical Expenses $10,000.00; Future Medical 
Expenses $0.00; Non-economic damages $7,500.00; Total $17,500. (R. 1559.) 
Gines filed a "motion for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and/or motion for a new trial on damages." (R. 1580.) In pertinent part, 
Gines argued that Dr. Goldman had unfairly been permitted to testify at trial 
outside the scope of his report, and that "Garth Gines is entitled to a directed 
verdict on the issue of special damages, because the Defendant failed to provide 
the jury with a non-arbitrary basis for apportioning damages.~' (R. 1579.) The trial 
court denied the motion (R. 167 4 ), and Mr. Gines timely appealed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the jury's verdict and the district court's rulings 
because the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of 
01 Defendant's expert Alan Goldman, M.D. Initially, because Mr. Gines failed to 
order a transcript of the April 28, 2014, hearing during which the district court 
VJ articulated the basis for its order regarding the admissibility of Dr. Goldman's 
testimony, Mr. Gines failed to provide an adequate evidentiary record on appeal 
for assessing the claimed abuse of discretion. Based upon such, the district court's 
ruling must be presumed to be correct. 
Moreover, even if the Court reaches the merits of Mr. Gines's contentions, 
the proceedings below should nonetheless be affirmed. The trial court properly 
admitted Dr. Goldman's testimony based upon its finding that the timing of 
Defendant's disclosure of Dr. Goldman's report was harmless to Mr. Gines. Mr. 
Gines has failed to establish on appeal any abuse of discretion on the part of the 
district court in admitting Dr. Goldman's testimony where Mr. Gines failed to 
discuss the facts pertinent to the cause of ongoing delay in the lawsuit and the lack 
of prejudice to Mr. Gines, and where Mr. Gines himself relied upon Dr. Goldman's 
testimony and opinions to obtain affirmative rulings in his favor. 
Nor has Mr. Gines established that the district court abused its discretion 
when it limited the scope of Dr. Goldman's testimony at trial. The district court's 
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ruling should be affirmed because Mr. Gines has not marshalled the evidence in 
support of the jury's findings. Indeed, Mr. Gines has not identified any evidentiary 
basis for a finding that the district court erred by admitting either Dr. Goldman's 
opinion that Mr. Gines's injury was temporary or regarding what the expected 
treatment would be for a normal person. Further, Mr. Gines cannot show prejudice 
as a result of the trial court's allowing Dr. Goldman to testify regarding the 
reasonable value of medical treatment that Mr. Gines received that was related to 
the accident. Because Mr. Gines did not offer any of his own evidence at trial 
regarding the amount of medical expenses that would be attributable to his 
temporary neck sprain/strain (i.e., the actual injury the jury found that Mr. Gines 
sustained), the jury likely would have awarded Mr. Gines nothing had it not heard 
Dr. Goldman's testimony on that point. 
The same goes for Mr. Gines's criticisms regarding Dr. Goldman's 
testimony about estimates of costs for the type of treatment typically prescribed for 
similar injuries. The trial court disagreed, partly on the basis that Mr. Gines' s own 
counsel admitted that he was not surprised by the cost figures Dr. Goldman opined. 
Finally, Mr. Gines has not established that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for directed verdict, JNOV, or new trial. Harris v. 
Shopko, 2013 UT 34 is inapplicable here because Mr. Gines's injuries from the 
accident were temporary. In lawsuits involving temporary injuries that resolve 
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themselves over time, there by definition is nothing to "apportion." Harris is 
simply inapplicable to a temporary injury that does not contribute at all to the 
patient's current condition. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
MR. GINES HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ALLOWING 
DR. GOLDMAN TO TESTIFY. 
Mr. Gines' s first argument on appeal is that "the trial court abused its 
discretion when it found the non-disclosure of Dr. Goldman's report to be 
harmless." (Gines Br., p. 18.) Mr. Gines acknowledges that the report was 
disclosed long before trial ( and thus was allegedly tardy rather than non-disclosed). 
Mr. Gines further acknowledges that the trial court "found the non-disclosure of 
his report until March 18, 2014 to be harmless." (Gines Br., p. 19.) Mr. Gines 
argues, however, that "[ s ]uch a finding of harmlessness is without reasonable 
basis." Id. 
There are several independently dispositive problems with Mr. Gines's 
argument. First, the record on appeal is not sufficient to evaluate the trial court's 
ruling, which therefore must be presumed correct. 7 The trial court held a hearing 
7 See e.g. In re H.M, 2007 UT App 257 (per curiam) (affirming trial court's ruling 
where appellant failed to provide an adequate record on appeal by not ordering 
hearing transcripts; "Without an adequate record, this court must presume the 
regularity of the proceedings below.") (citing State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24,113, 
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on this issue and (according to the court's order) made findings during that April 
28, 2014, hearing. Those oral findings were later incorporated by reference into 
the challenged order. See p. 7, supra. There is no transcript of that hearing in the 
record, however. It is therefore impossible for this Court to know what was 
presented to the trial court, what the court found, or why the court exercised its 
discretion as it did. It is similarly impossible to say that the trial court abused that 
discretion. 
Second, although Mr. Gines restates his arguments as to why the timing of 
the disclosure was not harmless, he fails to even acknowledge - let alone rebut -
Defendant's arguments to the contrary. Seep. 6, supra (summarizing defendant's 
arguments regarding Mr. Gines causing much of his own delay, lack of prejudice, 
and similarity to "harm" incurred by Defendant in allowing Mr. Gines's sister to be 
added to the lawsuit). The exercise of discretion by a trial court involves the 
weighing of competing considerations. Mr. Gines's brief does not address any of 
the competing considerations regarding (lack of) prejudice from the allegedly late 
report. By definition, he has failed to meet his burden of proving abuse of 
discretion. 
69 P.3d 1278); see also U.R.A.P. 1 l(e )(2) ("If the appellant intends to urge on 
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, 
the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion."). 
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Third, Mr. Gines cannot show prejudice because Mr. Gines himself 
affirmatively relied on Dr. Goldman's testimony to obtain summary judgment in 
his favor on two important issues: 1) that Mr. Gines had suffered injuries in the 
accident, and 2) that Mr. Gines's medical expenses were reasonable and necessary. 
See pp. 9-10, supra. Mr. Gines cannot both claim prejudice from Dr. Goldman 
ll) being allowed to testify at all while simultaneously relying on Dr. Goldman to 
prove his own case. 
II. MR. GINES HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE 
SCOPE OF DR. GOLDMAN'S TRIAL TESTIMONY. 
In Point II of his brief, Mr. Gines argues that the trial court improperly 
permitted Dr. Goldman to testify "outside his report in three material ways". The 
entirety of Mr. Gines's argument is this: 
The court permitted Dr. Goldman to tell the jury that Mr. Gines suffered a 
mere temporary sprain/strain injury. The court permitted Dr. Goldman to 
tell the jury what reasonable and necessary treatment would be for a person 
without altered cervical anatomy. The court did not allow Dr. Goldman to 
testify as to what treatment would have been necessary for a person with Mr. 
Gines' s altered anatomy. 
At trial, Dr. Goldman testified that reasonable and necessary medical 
treatment for a normal person would amount to approximately $10,000. (R. 
1693 at431:14-432:l-7). 
This number was not contained in his report. It was a complete and total 
surprise. It is absolutely certain this testimony hurt the plaintiffs ability to 
rebut Dr. Goldman's opinions and is directly reflected in the jury's award of 
$10,000 for medical economic damages. 
25 
(Gines Br., p. 22.) 
There are, again, several problems with Mr. Gines's contentions. Initially, 
Mr. Gines makes no effort to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's 
findings, which Mr. Gines characterizes as "speculat[ive ]," "against the weight of 
the evidence," "arbitrary," "not supported by the evidence," and "no[t] rational." 
(Gines Br., pp. 28, 29.) While failure to marshal is not an automatic ground for 
affirmance, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that an appellant who fails to 
marshal will rarely meet its burden of proof on appeal. That is the case here. 
Dr. Goldman's opinion that Mr. Gines's injury was temporary was expressly 
contained within his report, see pp. 8-9, supra, and there was no error in allowing 
him to restate that opinion at trial.8 
With respect to Dr. Goldman's testimony regarding what the treatment 
would be for a normal person, it is again hard to see any abuse of discretion, 
particularly when the judge also required him to tell the jury that Mr. Gines did not 
have normal physiology, and Dr. Goldman explained the principal differences 
between treatment of a normal person and treatment of someone like Mr. Gines 
8 For the same reason, there is no basis for Mr. Gines's averment that Dr. Goldman 
"recanted at trial and stated 0% of Mr. Gines's current condition was attributable to 
the accident." (See Gines Br., p. 24 n.2.) Dr. Goldman had been stating that all 
along. 
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and why treatment of someone with altered anatomy could be less expensive. See 
p. 18, supra. 
Nor has Mr. Gines shown prejudice from this alleged error. Mr. Gines 
vJ argues that the jury must have unthinkingly accepted Dr. Goldman's testimony 
because Dr. Goldman mentioned $10,000 and the jury awarded $10,000 in past 
v, medical expenses. (Gines Br., p. 22, and p. 26 Gury was "completely confused" 
and "10,000 is a complete nonsense answer to that question").) 
Mr. Gines overlooks a couple of key points: First, Dr. Goldman's trial 
v; 
testimony was actually "7, 8, or $10,000". See p. 18, supra. If the jury simply 
plowed ahead unthinkingly, why did it not pick $7,000 rather than $10,000? 
There is a more fundamental problem with any claim of prejudice. The jury 
found that Mr. Gines suffered only temporary injuries in the accident (hence the 
lack of future medical expenses). It was Mr. Gines's burden to prove what the 
reasonable and necessary expenses were for the injuries as found by the jury 
~ (temporary neck strain), not the injuries he wished the jury to find (all of Mr. 
Gines' s present neck injuries). Mr. Gines presented no evidence of his own for the 
expenses associated with the injuries actually found by the jury. Ironically, but for 
Dr. Goldman's testimony, the jury could well have awarded Mr. Gines nothing for 
his temporary injury due to a complete lack of evidence as to the expenses 
associated with such an injury. 
27 
Mr. Gines also overlooks an alternative basis upon which the jury could 
have reached its conclusion. Mr. Gines's own brief provides this summary: "Mr. 
Gines's medical expenses the day before his surgery only totaled $6,021.90. 
Immediately after his surgery, his medical bills totaled $56,730.04." (Gines Br., p. 
29.) Using Mr. Gines's own figures, once the jury concluded that the surgery was 
not caused by the accident, it could well have performed this mathematical 
calculation from his own evidence: $56,730.04 (expenses immediately after Mr. 
Gines's surgery) -$6,021.90 (medical expenses the day before Mr. Gines's surgery, 
which likely included preparation for the surgery)= at least $50,708.14 in surgery-
related costs. Subtracting $50,708.14 from $61,296.60 (stipulated total medical 
expenses) = $10,588.46, a figure quite close to the jury's final award of past 
medical expenses. Mr. Gines simply has not established prejudice from the 
allegedly improper testimony.9 
Finally, Mr. Gines takes issue with the trial court's reason for allowing Dr. 
Goldman to offer cost estimates for the type of treatment typically prescribed for 
similar injuries. In particular, Mr. Gines criticizes the court's mention of his 
counsel's experience when assessing notice or lack of prejudice. This criticism, of 
9 The jury heard other evidence along the same lines. For example, Mr. Gines's 
expert testified that the hospital component of the surgery alone would be up to 
$40,000 of Gines' $61,296.60 in medical expenses, that the surgical 
anesthesiologist's bill would be in the range of $2,500, etc. (R. 1691, p. 199:21-
203:5.) See also Trial Exhibits 1, 2, and 7 (all of Mr. Gines' medical records). 
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course, suffers from the same lack of prejudice as discussed above. But in any 
event, it is unfair. The court asked for a "candid" response to whether counsel was 
truly surprised by the numbers, and was told no. See p. 13, supra. It is not an 
abuse of discretion for a court to ask an attorney to be candid. See, e.g., 
U.R.Prof.C. 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal). Moreover, Mr. Gines's counsel had 
~ himself cited his experience to the jury in opening statement, remarking, "I've 
been doing this for 30 plus years, and over a hundred jury trials." (R. 1690, 
p.111 :3-4.) It cannot be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to consider the same 
fact that a party has asked the jury to consider. 
III. MR. GINES HAS NOT SHOWN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY 
v> THE TRIAL COURT IN DENYING HIS MOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR 
NEW TRIAL. 
In Point III of his brief, Mr. Gines argues that "the trial court erred when it 
denied plaintiff's multiple motion~ for judgment as a matter of law on 
apportionment and medical economic damages." (Gines Br., p. 22.) Much of this 
point consists of reargument from Points I and II; the responses to those arguments 
above are incorporated herein. 
Mr. Gines argues in Point III that Defendant had the burden to apportion 
Gines's damages between those attributed to his preexisting cervical spine 
condition and those attributed to the injury arising from the auto accident. He 
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argues that Defendant failed to adduce a non-arbitrary basis for the jury to so 
apportion. (Gines Br., p. 23, citing Harris v. Shopko, 2013 UT 34, ~~ 28-38.) 
As discussed above, however, Harris apportionment was not even at issue if 
the jury believed Defendant's theory of the case, i.e., that Gines's injuries from the 
accident were temporary. Much like a sprained ankle might cause discomfort for a 
while but the patient then "retum[s] to the baseline," as Dr. Goldman puts it, the 
jury was free to believe that Gines suffered a similarly short-term neck strain. 
With a person who suffers an acute/temporary injury, there is nothing to 
"apportion" in the sense argued by Gines. Instead, the question is what the 
reasonable and necessary medical expenses are associated with that temporary 
injury. For example, a broken leg might require an x-ray, doctor's visit, pain 
medication, etc., for a short period. "Whiplash" might require some physical 
therapy for a short period. A plaintiff would be entitled to the reasonable cost of 
such treatment, but no more. That is what Defendant here argued, and what the 
jury believed. See, e.g., R. 1559 (special verdict awarding no future medical 
expenses). 10 
10 Mr. Gines did offer his own expert testimony that the accident caused permanent 
injury. But the jury was free to choose between conflicting expert testimony or 
even to disregard such testimony. See R. 1491-1492 (Instr. 17, 18) and R. 1431, 
1434 (Gines requesting those instructions).) Additionally, Mr. Gines's expert 
admitted that his opinions were based in large part upon subjective reports by Mr. 
Gines (of pain, etc.). (R. 1691, pp. 181:1-182:7.) At trial, Defendant impeached 
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Mr. Gines's position is not supported, let alone compelled, by Harris v. 
Shopko. Harris was focused on proximate cause. This Court initially held that a 
preexisting condition cannot be said to be "proximate" if it ( 1) exists and (2) is 
asymptomatic. On certioriari, the Supreme Court bifurcated these predicates. 
Just because a condition is asymptomatic does not mean that it does not contribute 
to the ultimate injury; it could very well contribute. Thus, an expert would be 
needed to present this information to the jury so that it could decide, with expert 
assistance, whether a preexisting injury, symptomatic or not, is partially 
responsible for the patient's current condition. Harris has nothing to do with a 
temporary injury that does not contribute at all to the patient's current condition. 
See, e.g., Rowe v. Munye, 702 N. W.2d 729 (Minn. 2005) (in determining whether 
the defendant or plaintiff had the burden to demonstrate the apportionment of 
damages to a preexisting injury and a subsequent injury, the issue of whether the 
second injury was merely temporary, or a permanent aggravation of the prior 
condition, was crucial). 
Even if Harris had some bearing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding that Dr. Goldman had adequate foundation for his opinions (i.e., that 
they were not arbitrary). Mr. Gines's repeated citations to the word "arbitrary" in 
Gines' credibility extensively with conflicting statements, including several 
instances in which Mr. Gines seemed to be contradicting his own doctors. (E.g., R. 
1692, pp. 330-345.) 
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Dr. Goldman's testimony ignores Dr. Goldman's own clarification of what he-the 
witness himself - meant when he used the word. Seep. 19, supra. 
Mr. Gines' s principal complaint on this point is to claim that Dr. Goldman 
"did not testify when Mr. Gines's temporary aggravation ended ... " (Gines Br., p. 
27; also id., p. 28 ("Dr. Goldman simply did not tell the jury when Mr. Gines's 
injury ended.") While Mr. Gines fails to demonstrate why this would be material, 
it is incorrect in any event. Dr. Goldman opined repeatedly that Mr. Gines's injury 
was "acute" or "temporary," meaning that it lasted a couple of months, less than 
six. See p. 17, supra. While Mr. Gines says that Dr. Goldman did not render such 
an opinion as to patients with conditions similar to Mr. Gines's, he actually did; as 
mentioned above, on cross-examination, Dr. Goldman was asked that question, and 
reiterated that - even for patients with "worse" conditions - they recovered within 
a couple of months. See p. 17, n. 6, supra. 
IV. MR. GINES HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Mr. Gines' s fourth issue on appeal ( as identified in his Statement of Issues) 
complains of the trial court's denial of his motion for directed verdict. All of the 
issues upon which that motion was based have been addressed above; in short, no 
abuse of discretion or other error has been shown. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, defendant Sean Edwards respectfully 
requests the Court to affirm the trial court's judgment on jury verdict. 
DATED this 9th day of December, 2015. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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